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Articles
ALLEGING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT ON A
DISCERNIBLE MARKET: CHANGING THE
ANTITRUST LANDSCAPE FOR
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
RANDY HAIGHT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) basic
purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part
of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body.”1  Historically, courts have given deference to the
principles cited in the NCAA’s Constitution, its fundamental pur-
pose of maintaining amateurism and promoting academics in col-
legiate athletics.2  Nevertheless, success from continuous expansion
in size and scope, and the multitude of rules reconstructing the
regulation of collegiate athletics, brings a litany of lawsuits challeng-
ing the organization’s abusive concentrations of market power.  As
a result, a class action lawsuit brought by John Rock in 2012 against
the NCAA calls into question the continuing legal validity of this
deference to antitrust scrutiny concerning collegiate athletics.3
This Article will argue that the NCAA’s per sport scholarship
limit is an anticompetitive measure impacting a discernible market,
* Judicial Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
J.D., The George Washington University Law School.  The Author would like to
thank Professor F. Scott Kieff for his guidance and support throughout the devel-
opment of this Article.
1. NCAA, 2012-2013 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2012), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf [hereinafter NCAA
CONSTITUTION].
2. Id. (“The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are de-
signed to be a vital part of the educational system.  A basic purpose of this Associa-
tion is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports.”).  For a detailed discussion of cases in which the courts deferred to
NCAA principles, see infra notes 76-107 and accompanying text.
3. See Rock v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:12-cv-1019, 2013 WL
4479815 (S.D. Ind. July 25, 2012) (challenging NCAA regulations prohibiting
multi-year scholarships, and cap on number of allowable scholarships).  The prohi-
bition on multi-year scholarships has since been rescinded. See Agnew v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2013).
(19)
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thereby creating an antitrust violation.  Section II will provide a his-
torical overview of how NCAA regulations have changed over time.
Section III sets forth the antitrust issue, stemming from the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act, surrounding the NCAA scholarship limits, and
reviews the analysis courts utilize when considering challenges to
NCAA rules and regulations that affect antitrust matters.  Lastly,
Section IV details a pending lawsuit, Rock v. NCAA, and describes
how the aforementioned cases will likely affect the outcome.
II. NCAA BACKGROUND
A. Commercialism: How Intercollegiate Athletics Developed Into
an Enterprise Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny
Intercollegiate athletics emerged in 1852 when Harvard and
Yale Universities organized a rowing competition.4  Shortly thereaf-
ter, colleges and universities across the country began challenging
each other to athletic events that were generally governed by the
students themselves.5  Interschool athletic competitions grew stead-
ily throughout the nineteenth century, and, consequently, ques-
tions arose concerning the governance of these sporting events.6
Although faculty members started playing a more supportive role in
controlling athletic programs, the vital shift in regulating the ex-
cesses of intercollegiate athletics occurred in 1905 when President
Roosevelt called for the reformation of college football playing
rules due to the growing number of reported injuries and deaths
occurring during football games.7  In response, Henry McCracken,
Chancellor of New York University, coordinated a national meeting
of representatives from the major intercollegiate football teams.8
4. See WADE J. GILLEY, ADMINISTRATION OF UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC PROGRAMS: IN-
TERNAL CONTROL AND EXCELLENCE 18 (1986) [hereinafter “Administration of Uni-
versity Programs”].
5. See id. (“In the 1850s the [athletic captain] . . . assured the continuance of
the organization, served as its coach and administrator, organized fund raisers,
and promoted his club; he was the sole arbiter of the athletic program.”).
6. See id. (citing B. SPEARS & R. SWANSON, HISTORY OF SPORT AND PHYSICAL
ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 208 (1978)).
7. See John J. Miller, How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, N.Y. Post, Apr. 27,
2011, available at  http://nypost.com/2011/04/17/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-foot-
ball/ (“In 1905, with football’s violence becoming impossible to ignore, [Teddy
Roosevelt] summoned the coaches from Harvard, Princeton and Yale to the White
House and encouraged them to reform the game.  That winter, they created the
organization that became the NCAA and invented the forward pass — a revolu-
tionary rule change that separated the sport from its rugby-like origins and made it
a uniquely American game loved by millions today.”).
8. See GILLEY, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing efforts to create national organi-
zation to govern amateur athletics).
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Shortly thereafter, a group of representatives in attendance formed
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of America, later becoming
the NCAA.9  Initially, the NCAA only served as a rulemaking body
that would eliminate “unsavory violence” and preserve “amateur-
ism.”10  However, the NCAA has since developed substantially due
to the continued growth and complexity of intercollegiate athletics.
Beginning in the 1920’s, college football grew so much in pop-
ularity that enforcing the NCAA rules “presented a dilemma not
unlike the one posed by the Eighteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution where [ ] it prohibited the manufacture and sale of
alcoholic beverages.”11  In 1948, in an effort to develop a compli-
ance mechanism, the NCAA adopted a collection of rules on ama-
teurism, eligibility, and financial aid, known as the “Sanity Code.”12
More importantly, the Sanity Code created a tool through a compli-
ance committee that allowed the NCAA to terminate an academic
institution’s NCAA membership.13  Despite lofty expectations, the
Sanity Code had little success because expulsion was the sole rem-
edy.  Thus, the Sanity Code was repealed, and replaced in 1951 with
a new set of enforcement rules.  These rules were further developed
in 1976.  These rules included the creation of an enforcement body
given the authority to, among other things, penalize members for
rules violations.14
The various enforcement regulations afford the NCAA great
oversight over financial aid allotment, including the ability to pro-
vide economic support to student-athletes without regard to finan-
cial need or “remarkable academic ability.”15  The NCAA crafted
the foundation for “today’s corporate college sport” by balancing
and managing more than 1,200 athletic programs and an array of
regulations governing eligibility, penalizing improper payments or
endorsements, and limiting scholarship awards.16
9. See id.
10. James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND.
L.J. 9, 12 (1986).
11. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332 (2007) (quoting ALLEN L. SACK & EL-
LEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF
THE NCAA’S AMATEUR MYTH 35 (1998)).
12. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIA-
TION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 47 (1992).
13. See id. at 47-48.
14. See id.
15. See ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE:
THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA’S AMATEUR MYTH 47 (1998).
16. Id. at 49; see also In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 1144, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
3
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B. NCAA Scholarship Limitations Signal an
Anticompetitive Impact
The NCAA’s history of awarding athletic scholarships, includ-
ing enforcing per sport scholarship limitations, exemplifies the
NCAA’s tradition of exhibiting anticompetitive behavior.  Initially,
in 1906, the NCAA identified “[t]he offering of inducements to
players to enter Colleges or Universities because of their athletic
abilities and of supporting or maintaining players while students on
account of their athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations,
individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly” as a violation
of the “amateurism” ideal that the organization was created to pre-
serve.17  Despite the NCAA’s stance, it was common for student-ath-
letes to receive funding from outside sources to pay for the
student’s college education.  Nearly thirty years later, the NCAA fi-
nally drafted a declaration emphasizing the amateur status of stu-
dent-athletes, and stressing that financial awards were entirely need-
based and independent of a student’s athletic participation.18  Not-
withstanding this declaration, prior to 1973, a free market athletic
scholarship system was in place because no formal NCAA rule or
regulation limited the length or number of scholarships an institu-
tion could award, thus allowing competition among the colleges
and universities to vie for the athletic services of an unfixed amount
of players for a one to four year term.19
In 1973, at the NCAA Annual Convention, the NCAA passed
numerous amendments to its constitution and bylaws creating a
more centralized regulation of athletic scholarships, including
changing the duration of grants-in-aid from four-years to one-year
renewable contracts.20  Only three years later, the constitution was
further amended to limit the number of total scholarships awarded
in a given sport and for a specified year.21  Article 15.5 of the NCAA
bylaws details the maximum limit on the number of athletes partici-
17. See Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST., PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N
OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1906) [hereinafter BYLAWS] (providing bylaws at article
VI, § (a)(1)).
18. See Louis Hakim, Article, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student: Has the
Time Arrived for an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & LAW 145,
169 (2000) (citing RONALD A. SMITH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM: THE RISE OF BIG-TIME
COLLEGE ATHLETICS 25 (1988)).
19. See Thomas R. Ostdiek, LB 69: Need Based Financial Aid for College Athletes,
25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729, 740 (1992).
20. Id. at 741.
21. James V. Koch & Wilbert M. Leonard, The NCAA: A Socio-Economic Analysis,
37 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOC. 225, 235 (1978).
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss1/2
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 5 25-FEB-14 13:56
2014] CHANGING THE ANTITRUST LANDSCAPE 23
pating in sports that can receive financial aid for their athletic
ability.22
The primary purpose for enforcing a scholarship cap was to
create uniformity in terms of the number of athletic scholarships
institutions could award; however, that logic fails when instead, the
bylaw oppresses competition.  More specifically, imposing this rule
restricts an athlete’s opportunity to receive a scholarship by provid-
ing coaches with the ability to reduce their production costs in play-
ers who get injured or fail to yield results to their coach’s
satisfaction.  Accordingly, the scholarship cap eliminates, or at a
minimum weakens, economic competition for collegiate athletes
that cannot negotiate their financial aid packages even though the
athletic programs continue to benefit from the revenue players gen-
erate.23  Put differently, scholarship caps were created to provide
“cost reduction” to institutions, but such caps work to the detriment
of student athletes by increasing the cost of a college degrees.24  If
this issue presented itself in professional sports, absent a collective
bargaining agreement providing otherwise, Sherman Act concerns
would undoubtedly be implicated.25  Enforcing scholarship caps
has not received considerable scholarly attention, but the issue has
been, and remains, the subject of numerous antitrust lawsuits
against the NCAA.
II. SHERMAN ACT IMPLICATIONS IN THE NCAA’S
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
Enacted in 1890, Section I of the Sherman Act states, in broad
language, “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or oth-
erwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
22. NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 15.5, at 210-18 (stating that stu-
dent who receives financial aid based upon his or her involvement in athletics shall
become counter for year when aid is received).
23. See Daniel L. Fulks, NCAA, Revenues and Expenses: 2004-2010 NCAA Divi-
sion I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report, 36 tbl.3.11 (2011), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2010RevExp.pdf (finding
that median revenue for Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools in fiscal year
2010 was more than $16 million).
24. See Koch & Leonard, The NCAA: A Socio-Economic Analysis, supra note 21, at
235 (noting that caps or limitations reduce scholarship costs for NCAA institutions
while increasing cost of attendance for student-athletes who may otherwise receive
financial aid based upon his or her athletic ability).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(finding that NFL could not regulate competition for player’s services); see also
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (deciding that league could not
inhibit free agency).
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several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”26
The Supreme Court laid the fundamental framework for analyzing
conduct under Section I when it applied a “standard of reason” to
distinguish those “restraints of trade” that are necessary to develop
healthy free enterprise from restraints that are competitively harm-
ful.27  Following this model, only business conduct in unreasonable
“restraint of trade” violates Section I of the Sherman Act.  Thus, the
NCAA is not exempt from scrutiny under the Sherman Act.28
When the NCAA’s actions are “commercial” in nature, the Sher-
man Act applies with full force.29
A. Analyzing the NCAA’s Business Conduct
The indisputable policy of the Sherman Act is to deter unrea-
sonable restraints on competition.30  Whether a restraint is unrea-
sonable must be determined by examining “the competitive effects
of challenged behavior relative to such alternatives as its abandon-
ment or a less restrictive substitute.”31  Courts have established
three categories of analysis for determining if the challenged re-
straint enhances or oppresses competition: per se, rule of reason,
and quick-look.32
The per se rule is utilized when a “practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output.”33  Pursuant to this rule, certain re-
straints of trade are likely to harm competition and facially lack
procompetitive benefits.  These restraints are deemed illegal and
do not justify the time and expense necessary when “the Court
[can] predict with confidence that the Rule of Reason will con-
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
27. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (applying
standard of reason to determine whether trust agreement at issue was unreasona-
ble restraint of trade).
28. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98-100 (1984) (discussing NCAA policies with respect to television
rights constituted unreasonable restraint of trade under Sherman Act).
29. See, e.g., id. (holding that “payment of tuition in return for educational
services constitutes commerce” and thereby making NCAA subject to Sherman
Act).
30. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490–93 (1940) (noting that
intended goal was “the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or other-
wise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury”).
31. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1500, at 362-63 (1986).
32. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1999); see also Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 104.
33. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 (internal quotation omitted).
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demn [a restraint].”34  However, the per se rule is a “demanding”
standard that should only be applied to certain business practices
by reason of their nature.35
Under the rule of reason analysis, the finder of fact must deter-
mine whether an agreement has an anticompetitive effect on a le-
gally cognizable market.  As a threshold matter, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing anticompetitive effects.36  Generally, this in-
cludes an analysis of the defendants’ collective market power, and,
in some cases, proof of actual anticompetitive effects.37  If the plain-
tiff meets his burden, the defendant must then show that the re-
straint promotes a procompetitive objective.38  The rule of reason
analysis applies to cases that do not follow the per se rule.  Further,
the rule of reason has been applied to antitrust lawsuits against the
NCAA.  However, matters generally involving industries or organi-
zations “in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential
if the product is to be available at all” may use a different method
tangentially related to the rule of reason.39
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court suggested a
third approach, a middle ground analysis between the per se and
rule of reason called the “quick-look” analysis.40  This third frame-
work is utilized when the per se analysis is unsuitable, proof of mar-
ket power is not necessary, and “no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of . . . an
34. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990)
(quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)); see
also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (“[A]
per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or
important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.”).
35. See Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-50 (explaining that applying per se
rule may be appropriate when considering horizontal agreements in emerging
markets).
36. FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019-20
(10th Cir. 1998); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d
593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Substantial market power is an indispensable ingredient
of every claim under the full rule of reason.”).
38. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d
1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
39. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 100-01 (1984); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088
(7th Cir. 1992) (“Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in [Board of Regents], allega-
tions that the NCAA rules restrain trade or commerce may not be viewed as per se
violations of the Sherman Act.”); see also Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking Ahead
at Sports and the Antitrust Law, 14 ANTITRUST 15, 16 (2000) (stating that “it is now
settled that the practices typically associated with . . . organizations such as the
NCAA are not subject to the per se rule”).
40. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 108-09.
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agreement.”41  Additionally, the quick-look approach is used when
a restraint would normally be considered illegal per se, but “a cer-
tain degree of cooperation is necessary if the [product at issue] is to
be preserved.”42  Under this approach, treatment of the issue is
confined to the generalizations that “[inquire into] the case, look-
ing to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint,” and that
“[consider] whether the experience of the market has been so
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the
principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at
least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.”43
Both the rule of reason and quick-look approaches have been
utilized in lawsuits against the NCAA.  Determining the proper
analysis to use in a given context may change a plaintiff’s chance for
success in a Section I claim alleging the anticompetitive impact
scholarship limitations has on a bachelor’s degree.  Notwithstand-
ing whether the rule of reason or quick-look approach is utilized,
the following section will focus on the steps necessary for student-
athletes to establish an antitrust claim against the NCAA.
1. Anticompetitive Effect
In every Section I claim, plaintiffs must establish that NCAA
bylaws or regulations have an anticompetitive effect on a relevant
market.  Rules and regulations are by definition anticompetitive
when outputs are inconsistent with those in competitive markets.
However, a relevant market and market power must be properly
alleged to receive any merit.
a. Student Athletes Can Establish A Relevant Market
Included within an anticompetitive effects review is the deter-
mination of whether the market in which goods or services com-
pete is relevant to the plaintiff’s complaint.  The Supreme Court
stated that “no more definite rule can be declared than that com-
modities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce’, monopoli-
zation of which may be illegal.”44  There are three principal deci-
sions providing precedent for establishing relevant markets
41. Id. at 109 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
42. Id. at 117.
43. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (Breyer, J. concurring
in part).
44. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
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concerning the NCAA.  First, in Board of Regents, a relevant market
was found where college football telecasts were unreasonably re-
strained by an NCAA agreement limiting the quantity of televised
games each member could make available for broadcast.45  Second,
in Law v. NCAA, the court held that a relevant market existed where
college basketball coaches were unjustly controlled by price-fixing
constrains among NCAA member institutions that negatively af-
fected collegiate basketball.46  More recently, and equally impor-
tant, in In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,47 the
district court found a relevant market for Division I football pro-
grams.  These cases illustrate how courts are willing to recognize
the existence of relevant markets for the services of student-
athletes.
b. NCAA Does Have Market Power to Control Prices and
Exclude Competition
If student-athlete plaintiffs successfully establish a relevant mar-
ket for their services, then they must prove that the NCAA has
power over the specified market in order to establish anticompeti-
tive effects.  The Supreme Court has defined market power as the
“power to control prices or exclude competition.”48  Alternatively,
“market power may be presumed if the defendant controls a large
enough share of the relevant market.”49  Courts have recognized
the NCAA’s power over the student-athlete market.  In Banks v.
NCAA, the court stated “the NCAA and its member institutions have
near total control of the market of college players; such control
might be deemed to provide more than adequate market share to
constitute market power.”50  Moreover, the NCAA’s market power
has been acknowledged to be the “only rational inference that can
be drawn based on the nature of [the NCAA].”51  In a similar view-
point, “where a practice has obvious anticompetitive effects—as
45. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
46. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir.
1998).
47. 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
48. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391; see also Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 108 (“Mar-
ket power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a
competitive market.”).
49. Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs.,
Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995)).
50. Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 860 (N.D. Ind.
1990).
51. White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-999-RGK, slip op. at 4
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www.ncaaclassaction.com/deny.pdf.
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does price-fixing—there is no need to prove that the defendant
possesses market power.”52  Therefore, alleging market power may
be necessary, but is not a difficult hurdle to overcome.
B. Setting the Stage for Future Litigation: Case
Law Development
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents53 paved the way for antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA.  In
that case, the Supreme Court considered a Section I challenge to
the NCAA’s restriction on televising college football games.  Even
though the Court acknowledged that cooperation is necessary to
preserve collegiate competition, the Court ultimately concluded
that the challenged plan “prevent[ed] member institutions from
competing against each other,” thereby “creat[ing] a[n] unlawful
horizontal restraint.”54  After applying the quick-look analysis, the
Court held the restraint violated Section I of the Sherman Act.55
Prior to 1984, courts were extremely dismissive of antitrust
challenges to NCAA rules and regulations and often cited non-com-
mercial objectives when deciding in favor of the NCAA’s promotion
of amateurism and free competition.56  Nevertheless, the dynamics
of collegiate athletics changed significantly since Board of Regents
and the legal arena governing these challenges appears to be
changing as well.57  For instance, courts have found the award of
financial aid implicates “trade or commerce” and therefore is sub-
ject to the Sherman Act.58  The scholarship limitations fall into
both categories, establishing a necessary condition for finding a
Section I violation.  Recalling that the purpose of the rule was to
address production costs rather than to promote competition, a
52. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir.
1998).
53. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
54. Id. at 99; see also id. at 117.
55. See id. at 120.  For a detailed discussion of the anticompetitive effects of
this holding, see supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
56. See Lazaroff, supra note 11, at 337 (citing several cases for proposition in-
cluding challenges to number of assistant coaches and transfer eligibility
requirements).
57. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 108-09.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 1993) (cit-
ing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 n.22) (“[P]ayment of tuition in return for
educational services constitutes commerce.”); see also Metro. Intercollegiate Basket-
ball Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (detailing rules affecting sporting tournaments); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n, 902 F.Supp. 1394, 1410 (D. Kan. 1995) (discussing rules limiting coach-
ing salaries).
10
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plaintiff challenging the cap as a commercially motivated product
inhibiting inter-firm competition by unlawfully fixing prices would
likely be successful in an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA.59  The
lawsuits below portray the legal developments – through the various
nuances within each decision – at the forefront of reshaping inter-
collegiate athletics and the NCAA rule limiting scholarship awards.
1. McCormack v. NCAA
When striking down lawsuits against the NCAA, early decisions
following Board of Regents were premised upon preserving amateur-
ism because eligibility restraints were deemed to enhance competi-
tion.  For instance, in McCormack v. NCAA, a group of football
players, cheerleaders, and alumni challenged an NCAA rule that
limited “compensation” for student-athletes.60  The plaintiffs
claimed that the rule was a price-fixing measure to limit output
costs.61  While the Fifth Circuit allowed the complaint to survive a
rule of reason analysis at summary judgment, the court ultimately
ruled against the plaintiffs, reasoning that although the “NCAA has
not distilled amateurism to its purest form[,] [that] does not mean
its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some amateur ele-
ments are unreasonable.”62
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit – following the foundation set
by Board of Regents – was the first court to assume that the NCAA’s
bylaws and rules were subject to Section I of the Sherman Act.63
More specifically, the court found that the NCAA marketed college
football as a “product.”64  Despite that fact, the court stated that it is
“reasonable to assume” that the majority of NCAA regulations are
“justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic
teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public
interest in intercollegiate athletics.”65  Although the court ruled
against the plaintiffs, McCormack is significant because it is the first
59. For a detailed discussion of the NCAA violating the Sherman Act by cap-
ping scholarships, see supra notes 76-107 and accompanying text.
60. McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1988).
61. Id. at 1340.
62. Id. at 1345.
63. The Third Circuit used this logic when it upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit
claiming that an NCAA bylaw prohibited a student athlete from participating in
collegiate sports while enrolled in a graduate institution different from the stu-
dent’s undergraduate institution. See Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139
F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
64. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344.
65. Id. at 1344.
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case where a circuit court applied a reasonableness (i.e. rule of rea-
son) standard to NCAA bylaws restricting financial payments to stu-
dent-athletes.
2. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation
In the case of In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,
football players brought an antitrust claim alleging that walk-on
football players would have received athletic scholarships if the
NCAA did not limit the total number of scholarships that an NCAA
member school can award annually.66  In the complaint, the plain-
tiffs argued that the NCAA bylaw restricting schools to eighty-five
football scholarships was a horizontal restraint of trade in violation
of Section I of the Sherman Act.67  The court denied the NCAA’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings because it found that the
plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action.68  In their cause of action,
the plaintiffs alleged that the schools compete for athletic services
of amateur players who create a necessary “input” market to bring a
meritorious claim.69
Not surprisingly, the NCAA successfully pursued a settlement
that resulted in the plaintiffs accepting an extremely small amount
of money.70  Nevertheless, this case is important because the deci-
sion serves as the first example of a court finding a relevant market
in a case challenging the NCAA bylaws that limit scholarships for
athletic programs.  Furthermore, student athletes may now over-
come the NCAA’s traditional amateurism defense and at least sur-
vive the motion to dismiss stage of litigation.
3. Agnew v. NCAA
Agnew v. NCAA is an example of yet another case indicating
that reform is on the horizon.71  Joseph Agnew, a former NCAA
66. See In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144
(W.D. Wash. 2005).
67. See id. at 1147 (discussing plaintiff’s argument).
68. See id. at 1149-50 (deciding that capping number of scholarships college
team can grant does not implicate student-athlete eligibility “in the same manner
as rules requiring students to attend class or rules revoking eligibility for entering a
professional draft”).
69. See id.
70. See In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at
1144; see also Mark Alesia, 3 Lawsuits May Change How NCAA Operates, USA TODAY,
July 26, 2009, available at www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-07-26-ncaa-law-
suits_N.htm (indicating that NCAA prefers litigating claims brought against it be-
cause settlement may excite flood of lawsuits brought by student athletes).
71. 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).  “[T]he prohibition against multi-year schol-
arships is, in a sense, a rule concerning the amount of payment a player reviews for
12
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student-athlete, brought a class action suit against the NCAA alleg-
ing the prohibition on multi-year athletic scholarships and restric-
tion on capping athletic scholarships for collegiate sports violates
Section I of the Sherman Act.72  Agnew argued the scholarship re-
strictions represented a deliberate price-fixing agreement that re-
duced competition and costs for NCAA member institutions.73  Put
differently, Agnew asserted that scholarship caps discouraged com-
petition by prohibiting athletic departments from offering scholar-
ships to fill all roster spots available on a given team.  Agnew
decided to claim that the relevant market was former student-ath-
letes seeking a bachelor’s degree; however, citing circuit precedent,
the district court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings because
the market was not “plausible.”74  The Seventh Circuit upheld the
decision, but submitted that the district court failed to consider
whether the restraint of trade was unreasonable.75
The Agnew decision signals the difficulty of claiming that the
NCAA’s bylaws violate Section I of the Sherman Act, but when read
together with the two aforementioned decisions, it suggests that the
NCAA’s price-fixing behavior, including its failure to cure output
costs, could violate antitrust provisions.
III. ROCK V. NCAA – THE NCAA VIOLATES THE SHERMAN ACT BY
CAPPING SCHOLARSHIPS
In July 2012, John Rock became the most recent student-ath-
lete to bring a lawsuit against the NCAA for violation of Section I of
the Sherman Act.76  Rock is a former football player from Gardner-
Webb University whose scholarship was not renewed following a
coaching change at the school.77  In his claim, Rock alleged that his
previous coach assured him a four-year scholarship if he remained
his labor, and thus may seem to implicate the split between amateur and pay-for-
play sports.” See id. at 344.
72. See id. at 332 (discussing Agnew’s argument that scholarship restriction is
violation of Sherman Act).
73. See id.; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1.
74. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011
WL 3878200, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011) (discussing implausibility of Plaintiffs’
argument establishing that “market” exists for sale of bachelor’s degrees due to
requirements that must be met for student-athletes to obtain degree (citing Banks
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992)).
75. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335 (“Most § 1 cases focus not on whether a rele-
vant market exists, but on the other aspect of the second required showing –
whether a restraint of trade in a given market was actually unreasonable.”).
76. See Rock v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:12-CV-10190JMS-DKL,
2013 WL 4479815, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013).
77. Id.
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academically eligible and further contended that limiting the num-
ber of athletic scholarships a school can offer prevented him from
obtaining a bargained for education.78
Two years ago, the United States Justice Department an-
nounced an investigation to determine whether the NCAA’s prohi-
bition on scholarships violates antitrust laws.79  Spontaneously, the
NCAA changed the bylaw prohibiting multi-year scholarships in
2011 before the Justice Department completed its investigation;80
however, the NCAA failed to address the rule limiting the number
of scholarships an institution may award to student athletes.  The
Rock claim addressed this concern by citing the rule limiting the
number and amount of scholarships that a school can give to stu-
dent athletes as a violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.81
A. The Anticompetitive Effects
Awarding athletic scholarships at the collegiate level would
seem, on its face, to promote a competitive market amenable to
antitrust concerns.  Undeniably, there can be little doubt that the
NCAA often promotes competition: during recruiting season, as
athletes may compete for elite athletic programs at well-known insti-
tutions or within specific conferences.82  Such competition moti-
vates colleges and universities to make themselves more appealing
by reducing prices through, among other things, athletic
scholarships.83
Despite this competitive facade, the NCAA’s per sport scholar-
ship limitation induces anticompetitive elements that buttress any
procompetitive benefit afforded to student athletes.  As previously
discussed, the first step in the rule of reason analysis is to determine
78. Id.
79. See Marlen Garcia, Federal Government Investigates NCAA Scholarship Rules,
USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
2010-05-06-notes-scholarships-hayward_N.htm.
80. See David Frank, Multiyear Scholarships: Why It May Affect You Differently Than
You Think, ATHLETICSCHOLARSHIPS.NET (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.athleticscholar-
ships.net/2012/04/09/multiyear-scholarships-why-it-may-affect-you-differently-
than-you-think.htm.
81. See Complaint at 13, ¶ 54, Rock, No. 1:12-CV-10190JMS-DKL (quoting By-
law which states that Division I collegiate football teams may award eighty-five full
scholarships to student athletes).
82. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 13.02.13.1, at 79 (stating
that “institution[s] may officially visit recruit, arrange telephone contact or in-per-
son visits and issue National Letter of Intent to offer athletically related financial
aid to prospective student athletes”).
83. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 234 (1990) (discussing how athletes are inter-
ested in financial gains including scholarship monies).
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whether the defendant possessed “the requisite market power
within a defined market” or produced “actual anticompetitive ef-
fects, such as control over output or price.”84  As a factual matter,
the NCAA possesses significant market power in regulating the
competition for student-athletes.  Intercollegiate athletes have few,
if any, substitutes for providing athletic services in exchange for re-
ceiving a college degree.85  Thus, the NCAA directly decides the
output costs for college athletes by inducing scholarship restrictions
for member schools, thereby creating an anti-competitive effect in
an unparalleled market.
The Seventh Circuit expressly held that “a labor market for stu-
dent-athletes . . . would meet plaintiffs’ burden of describing a cog-
nizable market under the Sherman Act.”86  When NCAA member
schools offer “in-kind benefits” in exchange for the opportunity to
pursue a bachelor’s degree,87 NCAA member schools are clearly en-
gaged in “transactions that are commercial in nature.”88  Thus, the
relevant market asserted by the plaintiffs in Rock – alleging a nation-
wide market for the labor of student athletes – is consistent with the
relevant markets found in other antitrust lawsuits filed against the
NCAA, along with the explicit instructions given by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Agnew.89
Notwithstanding the market analysis, an anticompetitive effect
may still be found without determining whether a relevant market
exists.  In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court stated that “when
there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output,
no elaborate industry analysis is required,” and “naked restraint[s]
on price and output require[ ] some competitive justification even
84. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (D. Kan. 1995).
85. See, e.g., Christopher Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA’s Unlaw-
ful Restraints of the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (1993) (“By im-
posing its regulations and restraining student-athletes, the NCAA willfully
maintains its monopoly power.”); see also Aidan McCormack, Comment, Seeking Pro-
cedural Due Process in NCAA Infractions Procedures: States Take Action, 2 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. . 261, 262 (1992) (“The NCAA is the monopoly of all intercollegiate sports.”).
86. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 346 (7th Cir. 2012)
(describing burden on plaintiffs necessary to satisfy test under Sherman Act).
87. See id. at 347 (discussing potential basis for commercial market regarding
NCAA schools and scholarships).
88. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing
how universities engage in commercial transactions).
89. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341 (deciding that “the transactions between NCAA
schools and student-athletes . . . take place in a relevant market with respect to the
Sherman Act”); see also White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-0999
RGK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (holding that “Major College Football” is relevant
market in which “colleges and universities compete to attract prospective student-
athletes”).
15
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in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”90  The complaint in
Rock specifically states:
By unlawfully agreeing to limit the number and amount of
athletics-based scholarships that a member institution can
grant in any given year, the NCAA and its member institu-
tions have ensured that student-athletes in the class re-
ceive tens of millions less for their labor for member
institutions than they would receive — and the member
institutions would pay — in a competitive market.91
The anticompetitive effects of the challenged regulation are evi-
dent.  To participate in NCAA sanctioned events, member institu-
tions must adhere to NCAA bylaws, including the scholarship cap,
thereby completely inhibiting student-athletes and schools from en-
tering into competitive pricing agreements that both parties favor.
Once again, the scholarship restrictions were initially a response to
NCAA members’ financial difficulties.92  Therefore, if the scholar-
ship limitation is considered a cost-cutting measure, then the an-
ticompetitive effect – exploiting students by unnecessarily
maximizing the cost of bachelor’s degrees – gains support.
Whether “proof of market power” is required to analyze the
anticompetitive effects in the Rock case should be of no concern to
the plaintiffs.  Under either the rule of reason or “quick-look” stan-
dards, the undisputed evidence supports a finding of anticompeti-
tive effect.  The NCAA adopted the scholarship cap primarily to
reduce costs for NCAA institutions.  One insider noted after the
rule’s passage that schools appreciated how the rule “giv[es] them
the legal and moral sanction of the NCAA” to cancel the scholar-
ships for athletes who did not perform to their expectations.93
While the member schools compete vigorously to recruit student
athletes, the scholarship cap remains successful in artificially lower-
ing the price of student-athlete services.94  As a result, this horizon-
tal restriction on financial aid for student-athletes eliminates price
competition among the NCAA members, and given the practice’s
90. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
91. Amended Complaint, supra note 76, at 6.
92. See BYLAWS, supra note 17, at § II.B.
93. Koch & Leonard, The NCAA: A Socio-Economic Analysis, supra note 21, at
236.
94. See Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 6 (revealing that schools spend
millions of dollars in “travel expenses, letters, phone calls, on-campus visits and the
use of recruiting services” to attract top talent).
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cost-cutting origins, Rock’s claim of unfair treatment receives even
greater standing.
B. The Procompetitive Benefits
Assuming the Rock plaintiffs will succeed in alleging anticom-
petitive behavior on the part of the NCAA, the burden will then
shift to the NCAA to prove that the restraint on trade caused by the
scholarship restrictions have procompetitive justifications that out-
weigh the anticompetitive effects.95  In essentially every antitrust
claim against the NCAA, two procompetitive justifications are al-
leged: preserving amateurism and maintaining a competitive bal-
ance in intercollegiate athletics.96
First and foremost, the NCAA will have difficulty arguing that
the scholarship limitations help maintain amateurism.  As discussed
earlier, the NCAA has maintained its amateur system through by-
laws where four-year scholarships were the norm.  However, after
lifting the multi-year scholarship ban, there is no reason to believe
that the scholarship cap has any independent effect on amateurism.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit recently acknowledged that the limit on
scholarships per team is “not inherently or obviously necessary for
the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general
product” of college sports.97  Instead, and as the district court prop-
erly observed in In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,
“the NCAA’s attempt to frame [the scholarship limitation] as chal-
lenging . . . amateurism . . . is a mis-characterization of the issues
raised . . . .”98
Next, the NCAA may use the procompetitive defense of com-
petitive balance.  To determine whether the NCAA’s proffered evi-
dence demonstrates competitive balance, the court must “consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.”99  Recalling the
origins of the scholarship limitation, it can be demonstrated that
the purpose was to cut costs in order to “save money for the col-
95. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.
96. See id. at 96; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328,
343 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing numerous cases that found amateurism to be at “very
existence” of college football).
97. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343.
98. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
99. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
17
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leges,” thereby creating an unlawful restraint on trade.100  Elite col-
leges, deemed the “Overlap Group,” attempted a similar feat by
establishing a universal formula for financial aid that produced
comparable aid packages for admitted students.101  Under the
Overlap Agreement, the member schools agreed to: (1) award aid
only on the basis of demonstrated need, (2) institute a uniform cal-
culation system, and (3) share financial information for admitted
students.102  Initially, the Justice Department charged the Overlap
Group with “unlawfully conspir[ing] to restrain trade” and, after all
of the defendant colleges (with the exception of MIT) entered into
a consent decree, the district court ruled against the lone school by
finding that the Overlap Agreement created illegal horizontal
price-fixing.103  Following an unfavorable appeal to the Third Cir-
cuit, MIT settled with the Justice Department.104  Consequently, all
colleges were required to implement their own financial aid for
common admits.105
The NCAA’s per sport scholarship limitation looks remarkably
similar to the issue in Brown University.  Under the Overlap Agree-
ment, member institutions colluded to set financial aid package
limitations and agreed to not negotiate further with admitted stu-
dents, resulting in direct horizontal price-fixing.  Athletic scholar-
ship restrictions take the form of the same antitrust violation.  Prior
to 1976, there were no scholarship restrictions, absent the multiyear
athletic scholarship ban, indicating that the change to the scholar-
ship cap had nothing to do with competitive balance.  Moreover,
schools likely have severe recruiting disadvantages by limiting the
players they can accept on scholarship.  As the Supreme Court elo-
quently stated, “The heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition.”106  Consequently, if the
court determines that the NCAA’s scholarship cap exists primarily
for cost cutting measures, and as a result deters competition, Rock
will successfully defeat the NCAA’s conventional defense mecha-
nism to Section I lawsuits.
100. WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATH-
LETES 228 (1995).
101. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993).
102. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
103. See id. at 289-90.
104. See CHRISTOPHER AVERY ET AL., THE EARLY ADMISSIONS GAME: JOINING THE
ELITE 33 (2003).
105. See id.
106. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
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C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
The final step in the rule of reason analysis focuses on whether
a less restrictive alternative could accomplish the procompetitive
justification.  Accordingly, if the NCAA were to convince the district
court that the scholarships cap provides a net procompetitive effect,
the restraint still violates Section I of the Sherman Act if the effect
could have been achieved through a less restrictive alternative.
Each federal circuit court has adopted its own version of a “less re-
strictive alternative” inquiry into their rule of reason analysis, and
the Seventh Circuit, not unlike its sister circuits, employs a standard
that lacks clarity.  In Agnew v. NCAA, the court stated, without con-
sidering, that the test must focus on “the competitive effects of chal-
lenged behavior relative to such alternatives as its abandonment or
a less restrictive substitute.”107
Bearing in mind the broad language in the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis, if the Rock case reaches this step, the lack of a less-restric-
tive alternative to the existing scholarship cap – that would preserve
amateurism and maintain competitive balance – would weigh in
favor of the plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years, some of the most important lawsuits
relating to intercollegiate athletics have been filed, yielding mixed
results.  Nevertheless, the pending Rock case presents an interesting
dichotomy: settle the lawsuit and encourage student-athletes to
bring additional claims, or expose its weak justifications for the
scholarship limitation bylaw.  Even though the NCAA has exper-
ienced consistent success in defending against student-athlete anti-
trust attacks, the recent repeal of the prohibition on multi-year
scholarships, coupled with the Rock lawsuit, will bring a great chal-
lenge to the NCAA that has the potential to substantially change
the current form of the NCAA’s bylaws.
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